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Abstract
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate
the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with
more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are
called (j, k) simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley-Shubik index for
(j, k) simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.
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1 Introduction
In [18] Shapley introduced a function that could be interpreted as the expected utility of a game from
each of its positions via the axiomatic approach – the so-called Shapley value. A bit later, see [19], it
was restricted to games with binary decisions, i.e., simple games. An axiomatization of this so-called
Shapley-Shubik index was given quite a few years later by Dubey [3]. Nowadays, the Shapley-Shubik
index is one of the most established power indices for committees drawing binary decisions. However,
not all decisions are binary. Abstaining from a vote might be seen as a third option for the committee
members. In general, there might also be any number j ≥ 2 of alternatives that can be chosen from. To
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this end, simple games were generalized to (j, k) simple games [7], where j is the number of alternatives
in the input, i.e., the voting possibilities, and k the number of alternatives for the group decision. A
Shapley-Shubik index for these (j, k) simple games was introduced in [5] generalizing earlier attempts
for special cases, see e.g. [4, pp. 291–293]. However, also other variants have been introduced in
the literature, see e.g. [2, 8, 10]. Here, we will only consider the variant from [5]. A corresponding
axiomatizations is given in [6].
If we normalize the input and output levels to numbers between zero and one, we can consider
the limit if j and k tend to infinity for (j, k) simple games. More precisely we can consider the input
levels i/(j − 1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 and the output levels i/(k − 1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Then those
games are discrete approximations for games with input and output levels freely chosen from the real
interval [0, 1]. The later games were called simple aggregation functions in [13], linking to the literature
on aggregation functions [9], and interval simple games in [14]. A Shapley-Shubik like index for those
games was motivated and introduced in [12], an axiomatization is given in [14].
The success story of the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games, initiated by [18] and [19], triggered
a huge amount of modifications and generalizations to different types of games, see e.g. [1] for some
current research directions. We think that the variants from [5], for (j, k)-simple games, and from
[12], for interval simple games, form one consistent way to generalize the Shapley-Shubik index for
simple games. Here we mainly focus on an axiomatic justification, see our main result in Theorem 5.1.
Moreover, we present another formula for the Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) simple games which is
better suited for computation issues, see Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 4.1. For a generalization of the
Banzhaf index a similar result was obtained in [17]. As the title of the preface of [1] names it, the idea
of the Shapley value is the root of a still ongoing research agenda.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the necessary
preliminaries and present the first few basic results. A Shapley-Shubik index Φ for general (j, k) simple
games is introduced in Section 3. Moreover, we study the first basic properties of Φ. In Section 4
we introduce the average game, which is a TU game associated to each (j, k) simple game. This
notion is then used to formulated the new axiom of average convexity, which culminates in an axiomatic
characterization of Φ in Section 5. In Section 6 we transfer all notions and the axiomatic characterization
to interval simple games.
2
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of voters. Any subset S of N is called a coalition and the set of all
coalitions of N is denoted by the power set 2N . For given integers j, k ≥ 2 we denote by J = {0, . . . , j−1}
the possible input levels and by K = {0, . . . , k − 1} the possible output levels, respectively. We write
x ≤ y for x, y ∈ Rn if xi ≤ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N we write xS for the restriction of
x ∈ Rn to (xi)i∈S . As an abbreviation, we write x−S = xN\S . Instead of x{i} and x−{i} we write xi and
x−i, respectively. Slightly abusing notation we write a ∈ Rn, for the vector that entirely consists of a’s,
i.e., 0 for the zero vector.
A simple game with player set N is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} with v(∅) = 1, v(N) = 1, and
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Coalitions S ⊆ N with v(S) = 1 are called winning and losing
otherwise. The interpretation in the voting context is as follows. Those elements i ∈ N , called voters or
players, that are contained in a coalition S are those that are in favor of a certain proposal. The other
voters, i.e., those in N\S, are against the proposal. If v(S) = 1 then the proposal is implemented and
otherwise the status quo persists. A simple game v is weighted if there exists a quota q ∈ R>0 and weights
wi ∈ R≥0 for all i ∈ N such that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. As notation we use [q;w1, . . . wn]
for a weighted (simple) game. An example is given by v = [4; 3, 2, 1, 1] with winning coalitions {1, 2},
{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, and {2, 3, 4}. A simple game v is a unanimity game
if there exists a coalition ∅ 6= T ⊆ N such that v(S) = 1 iff T ⊆ S. As an abbreviation we use the
notation γT for a unanimity game with defining coalition T . It is well known that each simple game
admits a representation as disjunctions of a finite list of unanimity games. Calling a winning coalition
minimal if all proper subsets are losing, such a list is given by the minimal winning coalitions, i.e., by
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and {2, 3, 4} in the above example.
If being part of a coalition is modeled as voting “yes” and “no” otherwise, represented as 1 and 0,
respectively, then one can easily reformulate and generalize the definition of a simple game:
Definition 2.1. A (j, k) simple game for n players, where j, k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1 are integers, is a mapping
v : Jn → K with v(0) = 0, v(j− 1) = k − 1, and v(x) ≤ v(y) for all x, y ∈ Jn with x ≤ y. The set of
all (j, k) simple games on N is denoted by U j,kn or by Un, whenever j and k are clear from the context.
So, (2, 2) simple games are in one-to-one correspondence to simple games. We use the usual ordering
of J (and K) as a set of integers, i.e., 0 < 1 < · · · < j − 1. In words, in the input set, 0 is the lowest
level of approval, followed by 1 and so on. In general, we call a function f : Rn ⊇ U → R monotone if
we have f(x) ≤ f(y) for all x, y ∈ U with x ≤ y. We remark that in [5] the author considers a more
general definition of a (j, k) simple game than we have presented here. Additionally the j input levels
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and the k output levels are given by a so-called numeric evaluation. Our case is called uniform numeric
evaluation there, which motivated the notation Un for (j, k) simple games for n players. We also call a
vector x ∈ Jn a profile.
Definition 2.2. Given a (j, k) simple game v with player set N , we call a player i ∈ N a null player if
v(x) = v(x−i, yi) for all x ∈ J
n and all yi ∈ J . Two players i, h ∈ N are called equivalent if v(x) = v(x
′)
for all x, x′ ∈ Jn with xl = x
′
l for all l ∈ N\{i, h}, xi = x
′
h, and xh = x
′
i.
In words, a player i is a null player if its input xi does not alter the output v(x). If interchanging
the input xi and xh of two players does never alter the output v(x), then players i and h are equivalent.
By πih we denote the transposition on N interchanging i and h, so that the previous condition reads
v(x) = v(πihx) for all x ∈ J
n. By Sn we denote the set of permutations of length n, i.e., the bijections
on N .
Now let us introduce a subclass of (j, k) simple games with the property that for each profile x,
the collective decision v(x) is either 0 (the lowest level of approval) or it is k − 1 (the highest level of
approval) depending on whether some given voters report some minimum approval levels. For example,
when any full support of the proposal necessitates a full support of each voter in a given coalition S,
players in S are each empowered with a veto. One may require from each player in S only a certain
level of approval for a full support of the proposal. All such games will be called (j, k) simple games
with point-veto.
Definition 2.3. A (j, k) simple game with a point-veto is a (j, k) simple game v such that there exists
some a ∈ Jn\{0} satisfying v(x) = k − 1 if a ≤ x and v(x) = 0 otherwise for all x ∈ Jn. In this case,
a is the veto and the game v is denoted by ua. For each coalition S ∈ 2N we abbreviate wS = ua, where
ai = j − 1 for all i ∈ S and ai = 0 otherwise.
We remark that (2, 2) simple games with a point veto are in one-to-one correspondence to the
subclass of unanimity games within simple games. The set of all players who report a non-null approval
level is denoted by Na, i.e., Na = {i ∈ N : 0 < ai ≤ j − 1}. Every player in N
a will be called a vetoer
of the game ua. Note that for the vector a defined via wS = ua we have Na = S.
Null players as well as equivalent players can be identified easily in a given (j, k) simple game with
point-veto:
Proposition 2.1. Let a ∈ Jn\{0}. A player i ∈ N is a null player of ua iff i ∈ N\Na. Two players
i, h ∈ N are equivalent in ua iff ai = ah.
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Proof. For every a ∈ Jn\{0} and every i ∈ N\Na we have ai = 0 by the definition of N
a. Now let
i ∈ N\Na. For every x ∈ Jn and every yi ∈ J we have a ≤ x iff a ≤ (x−i, yi). Thus, u
a(x) = ua (x−i, yi)
and i is a null player in ua. Now let i ∈ Na, i.e., ai > 0. Since v(a) = k − 1 6= 0 = v (a−i,0i), player i
is not a null player in ua.
Assume that ai = ah and consider an arbitrary x ∈ J
n. Then we have a ≤ x if and only if a ≤ πihx.
The definition of ua directly gives ua(x) = ua(πihx), so that the players i and h are equivalent in u
a. Now
suppose that the players i and h are equivalent in ua. Since a ≤ a, we obtain ua(a) = ua(πiha) = k− 1.
This implies that a ≤ πiha. Therefore ai ≤ ah and ah ≤ ai, that is ai = ah.
Note that (j, k) simple games can be combined using the disjunction (∨) or the conjunction (∧)
operations to obtain new games.
Definition 2.4. Let v′ and v′′ be two (j, k)-simple games with player set N . By v′ ∨ v′′ we denote the
(j, k) simple game v defined by v(x) = max{v′(x), v′′(x)} for all x ∈ Jn. Similarly, by v′ ∧ v′′ we denote
the (j, k) simple game v defined by v(x) = min{v′(x), v′′(x)} for all x ∈ Jn.
We remark that the defining properties of a (j, k) simple game can be easily checked. This can be
specialized to the subclass of (j, k) simple games with point veto, i.e., (j, k) simple games with point-veto
can be combined using the disjunction (∨) or the conjunction (∧) operations to obtain new games. To
see this, consider a non-empty subset E of Jn\{0} and define the (j, k) simple game denoted by uE by
uE(x) = k − 1 if a ≤ x for some a ∈ E and uE(x) = 0 otherwise, where x ∈ Jn is arbitrary. Note that
the notational simplification u{a} = ua, where a ∈ Jn\{0}, goes in line with Definition 2.3.
Proposition 2.2. Let E and E′ be two non-empty subsets of Jn\{0}. Then, we have uE ∨uE
′
= uE∪E
′
and uE ∧ uE
′
= uE
′′
, where E′′ = {c ∈ Jn : ci = max(ai, bi) for some a ∈ E and b ∈ E
′}.
Proof. In order to prove uE ∨ uE
′
= uE∪E
′
we consider an arbitrary x ∈ Jn. If uE∪E
′
(x) = k − 1,
then there exists a ∈ E ∪ E′ such that, a ≤ x. Therefore uE(x) = k − 1 or uE
′
(x) = k − 1 and
(uE ∨ uE
′
)(x) = k − 1. Now suppose that uE∪E
′
(x) = 0. Then, for all a ∈ E ∪E′ we have a  x. Since
E ⊆ E ∪ E′ and E′ ⊆ E ∪ E′ we have b  x and c  x for all b ∈ E and all c ∈ E′. This implies that
uE(x) = uE
′
(x) = 0 and (uE ∨ uE
′
)(x) = 0. Thus, uE ∨ uE
′
= uE∪E
′
.
Similarly, in order to prove uE ∧uE
′
= uE
′′
we consider an arbitrary x ∈ Jn. If uE
′′
(x) = k−1, then
there exists c ∈ E′′ such that c ≤ x. But, by definition of E′′, c = max(a, b) for some a ∈ E and b ∈ E′,
that is a ≤ c ≤ x and b ≤ c ≤ x. Hence, uE(x) = uE
′
(x) = k−1 and (uE∧uE
′
)(x) = k−1. Now assume
that uE
′′
(x) = 0 and (uE ∧ uE
′
)(x) 6= 0. By definition of uE and uE
′
, we have (uE ∧ uE
′
)(x) = k − 1.
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Thus, there exists a ∈ E and b ∈ E′ such that a ≤ x and b ≤ x. It follows that c = max(a, b) ≤ x,
which is a contradiction to uE
′′
(x) = 0. This proves uE ∧ uE
′
= uE
′′
.
For (j, k) = (5, 3) and n = 3 an example is given by E = {(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 2)}, E′ = {(4, 1, 1), (1, 1, 3)}.
With this, E′′ = {(4, 2, 3), (1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3), (4, 1, 2)}. Note that we may remove (4, 2, 3) from that list
since (4, 2, 3) ≥ (1, 2, 3) (or (4, 2, 3) ≥ (4, 1, 2)).
Especially, Proposition 2.2 yields that every (j, k) simple game of the form uE is a disjunction of
some (j, k) simple games with point-veto. So, each (j, k) simple game of the form uE will be called a
(j, k) simple game with veto. In the game uE , E can be viewed as some minimum requirements (or
thresholds) on the approval levels of voters’ inputs for the full support of the proposal. It is worth
noticing that uE is {0, k − 1}-valued; the final decision at all profiles is either a no-support or a full-
support. The set of all veto (j, k) simple games on N is denoted Vn. Note that Proposition 2.2 shows
that Vn is a lattice.
The sum of two (j, k) simple games cannot be a (j, k) simple game itself. However, we will show
that each (j, k) simple game is a convex combination of (j, k) simple games with veto.
Definition 2.5. A convex combination of the games v1, v2, . . . , vp ∈ Un is given by v =
∑p
t=1 αtvt for
some non-negative numbers αt, where t = 1, 2, . . . , p, that sum to 1.
Note that not all convex combinations of (j, k) simple games are (j, k) simple games.
Proposition 2.3. For each (j, k) simple game v there exist a collection of positive numbers αt, where
t = 1, 2, . . . , p, that sum to 1 and a collection Ft(v), where t = 1, 2, . . . , p, of non-empty subsets of J
n
such that v =
∑p
t=1 αtu
Ft(v).
Proof. Let v ∈ Un and F(v) = {x ∈ J
n, v(x) > 0}. Since Jn is finite and v is monotone, the elements of
F(v) can be labeled in such a way that F(v) = {x1, x2, . . . , xp}, where xp = 1, v(xt) ≤ v(xt+1) for all
1 ≤ t < p, and t ≤ s whenever xt ≤ xs. Now, set x0 = 0 and Ft(v) = {x
s, t ≤ s ≤ p}, αt =
v(xt)−v(xt−1)
k−1
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ p. By our assumption on xt we have αt ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ p. Moreover, it can be easily
checked that
∑p
t=1 αt =
v(xp)−v(x0)
k−1 = 1. set u =
∑p
t=1 αtu
Ft(v).
In order to prove that v = u, we consider an arbitrary x ∈ Jn. First suppose that x /∈ F(v). Since
v is monotone, there is no a ∈ F(v) such that a ≤ x. By definition, it follows that vFt(v)(x) = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , p. Therefore v(x) = u(x) = 0. Now suppose that x ∈ F(v). Then x = xs for
some s = 1, 2, . . . , p. It follows that for all t = 1, 2, . . . , p we have vFt(v)(x) = k − 1 if 1 ≤ t ≤ s and
vFt(v)(x) = 0 otherwise. Therefore
u(x) =
s∑
t=1
αt =
s∑
t=1
(
v(xt)− v(xt−1)
k − 1
· (k − 1)
)
= v(xs) = v(x).
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Clearly, the game v is a convex combination of the games uFt(v), where t = 1, 2, . . . , p.
Proposition 2.3 underlines the importance of (j, k) simple games with veto, i.e., every (j, k) simple
game can be obtained from (j, k) simple games with veto as a convex combination.
Now let us consider a continuous version of (j, k) simple games normalized to the real interval
I := [0, 1] for the input as well as the output levels. Following [13] and using the name from [14], we
call a mapping v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] an interval simple game if v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1, and v(x) ≤ v(y) for all
x, y ∈ [0, 1]n with x ≤ y. Replacing J by [0, 1] in Definition 2.2 we can transfer the concept of a null
player and that of equivalent players to interval simple games.
3 The Shapley-Shubik index for simple and (j, k) simple games
Since in a typical simple game v not all players are equivalent, the question of influence of a single
player i on the final group decision v(S) arises. Even if v can be represented as a weighted game, i.e.,
v = [q;w], the relative individual influence is not always reasonably reflected by the weights wi. This
fact is well-known and triggered the invention of power indices, i.e., mappings from a simple game on n
players to Rn reflecting the influence of a player on the final group decision. One of the most established
power indices is the Shapley-Shubik index [19]. It can be defined via
SSIi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n − s)!
n!
· [v(S) − v(S\ {i})] (1)
for all players i ∈ N , where s = |S|. If v(S) − v(S\{i}) = 1, then we have v(S) = 1 and v(S\{i}) = 0
in a simple game and voter i is called a swing voter.
In [19] the authors have motivated the Shapley-Shubik index by the following interpretation. Assume
that the n voters row up in a line and declare to be part in the coalition of “yes”-voters. Given an
ordering of the players, the player that first guarantees that a proposal can be put through is then
called pivotal. Considering all n! orderings π ∈ Sn of the players with equal probability then gives a
probability for being pivotal for a given player i ∈ N that equals its Shapley-Shubik index. So we can
rewrite Equation (1) to
SSIi(v) =
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
(
v({j ∈ N : π(j) ≤ π(i)}) − v({j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)})
)
. (2)
Setting Sipi := {j ∈ N : π(j) ≤ π(i)} we have S
i
pi = S for exactly (s − 1)!(n − s)! permutations π ∈ Sn
and an arbitrary set {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N , so that Equation (1) is just a simplification of Equation (2).
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Instead of assuming that all players vote “yes” one can also assume that all players vote “no”. In [16]
it is mentioned that the model also yields the same result if we assume that all players independently
vote “yes” with a fixed probability p ∈ [0, 1]. This was further generalized to probability measures p
on {0, 1}n where vote vectors with the same number of “yes” votes have the same probability, see [11].
In other words, individual votes may be interdependent but must be exchangeable. That no further
probability measures lead to the Shapley-Shubik index was finally shown in [15]. For the most symmetric
case p = 12 we can rewrite Equation (2) to
SSIi(v) =
1
n! · 2n
·
∑
(pi,x)∈Sn×{0,1}n
M(v, (π, x), i), (3)
where M(v, (π, x), i) is one if player i is pivotal for ordering π and vote vector x in v, see [15], and zero
otherwise.
This line of reasoning can be used to motivate a definition of a Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) simple
games as defined in [5], c.f. [12]. Suppose that voters successively and independently each choose a level
of approval in J with equal probability. Such a vote scenario is modeled by a roll-call (π, x) that consists
in a permutation π of the voters and a profile x ∈ Jn such for all i ∈ N , the integer π(i) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the entry position of voter i and xi is his approval level. Given an index h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, a voter
i is an h-pivotal voter if the vote of player i, according to the ordering π and the approval levels of his
predecessors, pushes the outcome to at least h or to at most h− 1.
Example 3.1. Let v be the (3, 3) simple game v for 2 players defined by v(0, 0) = v(1, 0) = 0, v(1, 1) =
v(0, 1) = 1, and v(2, 0) = v(0, 2) = v(2, 1) = v(1, 2) = v(2, 2) = 2. As an example, consider the ordering
π = (2, 1), i.e., player 2 is first, and the vote vector x = (2, 1). Before player 2 announce his vote x2 = 1
all outcomes in K = {0, 1, 2} are possible. After the announcement the outcome 0 is impossible, since
v(0, 1) = 1, while the outcomes 2 and 3 are still possible. Thus, player 2 is the 1-pivotal voter. Finally,
after the announcement of x1 = 2, the outcome is determined to be v(2, 1) = 2, so that player 1 is the
2-pivotal voter.
Going in line with the above motivation and the definition from [5], the Shapley-Shubik index for
(j, k) simple games is defined for all v ∈ Un and for all i ∈ N by:
Φi(v) =
1
n! · jn · (k − 1)
k−1∑
h=1
|{(π, x) ∈ Sn × J
n : i is an h-pivot for π and x in v}| . (4)
Since several different definitions of a Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k)-simple games have been intro-
duced in the literature, we prefer to use the more inconspicuously notation Φi(v) instead of the more
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suggestive notation SSIi(v). For the (j, k) simple game v from Example 3.1 we have
Φ(v) = (Φ1(v),Φ2(v)) =
(
5
12
,
7
12
)
.
Hereafter, some properties of Φ are explored. To achieve this, we introduce further definitions and
axioms for power indices on (j, k) simple games. First of all, we simplify Equation (4) to a more handy
formula.
Lemma 3.1. For each (j, k) simple game v ∈ Un and each player i ∈ N we have
Φi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n − s)!
n!
· [C(v, S)− C(v, S\{i})] , (5)
where s = |S| and
C(v, T ) =
1
jn(k − 1)
·
∑
x∈Jn
(
v((j− 1)T , x−T )− v(0T , x−T )
)
(6)
for all T ⊆ N .
Proof. For a given permutation π ∈ Sn and i ∈ N , we set π<i = {j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)}, π≤i =
{j ∈ N : π(j) ≤ π(i)}, π>i = {j ∈ N : π(j) > π(i)}, and π≥i = {j ∈ N : π(j) ≥ π(i)}. With this,
we can rewrite n! · jn · (k − 1) times the right hand side of Equation (4) to
∑
(pi,x)∈Sn×Jn
([
v(xpi<i , (j− 1)pi≥i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
]
−
[
v(xpi≤i , (j− 1)pi>i)− v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)
])
. (7)
The interpretation is as follows. Since v is monotone, before the vote of player i exactly the values
in
{
v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i), . . . , v(xpi<i , (j− 1)pi≥i)
}
are still possible as final group decision. After the vote of
player i this interval eventually shrinks to
{
v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i), . . . , v(xpi≤i , (j− 1)pi>i)
}
. The difference in
(7) just computes the difference between the lengths of both intervals, i.e., the number of previously
possible outputs that can be excluded for sure after the vote of player i.
As in the situation where we simplified the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game given by Equa-
tion (2) to Equation (1), we observe that it is sufficient to know the sets π≥i and π>i for every per-
mutation π ∈ Sn. So we can condense all permutations that lead to the same set and can simplify the
expression in (7) and obtain Equation (5).
While we think that the roll-call motivation stated above for Equation (4) is a valid justification on
its own, we also want to pursue the more rigor path to characterize power indices, i.e., we want to give
an axiomatization. A set of properties that are satisfied by the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games
and uniquely characterize the index is given, e.g., in [18, 19]. In order to obtain a similar result for (j, k)
simple games, we consider a power index F as a map form v to Rn for all (j, k) simple games v ∈ Un.
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Definition 3.1. A power index F for (j, k) simple games satisfies
• Positivity (P) if F (v) 6= 0 and Fi(v) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ Un;
• Anonymity (A) if Fpi(i)(πv) = Fi(v) for all permutations π of N , i ∈ N , and v ∈ Un, where
πv(x) = v(π(x)) and π(x) =
(
xpi(i)
)
i∈N
;
• Symmetry (S) if Fi(v) = Fj(v) for all v ∈ Un and all voters i, j ∈ N that are equivalent in v;
• Efficiency (E) if
∑
i∈N Fi(v) = 1 for all v ∈ Un;
• the Null player property (NP) if Fi(v) = 0 for every null voter i of an arbitrary game v ∈ Un;
• the transfer property (T) if for all u, v ∈ Un and all i ∈ N we have Fi(u) + Fi(v) = Fi(u ∨ v) +
Fi(u ∧ v), where (u ∨ v)(x) = max{u(x), v(x)} and (u ∧ v)(x) = min{u(x), v(x)} for all x ∈ J
n,
see Definition 2.4 and Proposition 2.2;
• Convexity (C) if F (w) = αF (u) + βF (v) for all u, v ∈ Un and all α, β ∈ R≥0 with α + β = 1,
where w = αu+ βv ∈ Un;
• Linearity (L) if F (w) = αF (u)+βF (v) for all u, v ∈ Un and all α, β ∈ R, where w = αu+βv ∈ Un.
Note that α · u+ β · v does not need to be a (j, k) simple game for u, v ∈ Un, where α · u is defined
via (α · u)(x) = α · u(x) for all x ∈ Jn and all α ∈ R. We remark that, obviously, (L) implies (C) and
(L) implies (T). Also (S) is implied by (A). Some of the properties of Definition 3.1 have been proven
to be valid for Φ in [5]. However, for the convenience of the reader we give an extended result and a
full proof next:
Proposition 3.1. The power index Φ, defined in Equation (4), satisfies the axioms (P), (A), (S), (E),
(NP), (T), (C), and (L).
Proof. We use the notation from the proof of Lemma 3.1 and let v be an arbitrary (j, k) simple game
with n players.
For each x ∈ Jn, π ∈ Sn, and i ∈ N , we have v(xpi<i , (j− 1)pi≥i) ≥ v(xpi≤i , (j− 1)pi>i) and
v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i) ≥ v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i), so that Φi(v) ≥ 0 due to Equation (7). Since we will show that Φ is
efficient, we especially have Φ(v) 6= 0, so that Φ is positive.
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For any permutation π ∈ Sn and any 0 ≤ h ≤ n let π|h := {π(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ h}, i.e., the first h
players in ordering π. Then, for any profile x ∈ Jn, we have
n∑
i=1
(
v(xpi<i , (j− 1)pi≥i)− v(xpi≤i , (j− 1)pi>i) + v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
)
=
n∑
h=1
(
v(xpi|h−1, (j− 1)−pi|h−1)−v(xpi|h, (j− 1)−pi|h)
)
+
n∑
h=1
(
v(xpi|h,0−pi|h)−v(xpi|h−1,0−pi|h−1)
)
= v(xpi|0, (j− 1)−pi|0)− v(xpi|n, (j− 1)−pi|n) + v(xpi|n,0−pi|n)− v(xpi|0,0−pi|0)
= v((j− 1))− v(x) + v(x)− v(0) = k − 1− 0 = k − 1,
so that Equation (7) gives
∑n
i=1 Φi(v) = 1, i.e., Φ is efficient.
The definition of Φ is obviously anonymous, so that it is also symmetric. If player i ∈ N is
a null player and π ∈ Sn arbitrary, then v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i) = v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i) and v(xpi<i , (j− 1)pi≥i) =
v(xpi≤i , (j− 1)pi>i), so that Φi(v) = 0, i.e., Φ satisfies the null player property. Since Equation (7)
is linear in the involved (j, k) simple game, Φ satisfies (L) as well as (C), which is only a relaxation.
Since x+ y = max{x, y}+min{x, y} for all x, y ∈ R, Φ also satisfies the transfer axiom (T).
Actually the proof of Proposition 3.1 is valid for a larger class of power indices for (j, k) simple
games. To this end we associate each vector a ∈ Jn with the function va defined by
va(S) =
1
k − 1
· [v((j− 1)S , a−S)− v(0S , a−S)]
for all S ⊆ N . With this, we define the mapping Φa on Un by
Φai (v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n − s)!
n!
[va(S)− va(S\{i}] (8)
for all i ∈ N . We remark that it can be easily checked that va is a TU game, c.f. Section 4.
Similar as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we conclude:
Proposition 3.2. For every a ∈ Jn such that ai = aj for all i, j ∈ N , the mapping Φ
a the axioms (P),
(A), (S), (E), (NP), (T), (C), and (L).
While the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games is the unique power index that is symmetric,
efficient, satisfies both the null player property and the transfer property, see [3], this result does not
transfer to general (j, k) simple games.
Proposition 3.3. When j ≥ 3, there exists some a ∈ Jn such that Φa 6= Φ.
Proof. Consider the (j, k) simple game ub with point-veto b = (1, j − 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Jn and let a =
(j − 2, j − 2, · · · , j − 2) ∈ Jn. From Equation (8) we conclude Φa(ub) = (0, 1, 0, · · · , 0). Using
Equation (5) we easily compute Φ(ub) =
(
1
j
,
j − 1
j
, 0, · · · , 0
)
6= Φa.
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We remark that the condition j ≥ 3 is necessary in Proposition 3.3, since for (2, 2) simple games the
roll-call interpretation of Mann and Shapley, see [16], for the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games
yields Φ0 = Φ1 = Φ.
4 The average game of a (j, k) simple game
Equation (5) in Lemma 3.1 has the important consequence that Φ(v) equals the Shapley value of the
TU game C(v, ·), where a TU game is a mapping v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. To this end we introduce
an operator that associates each (j, k) simple game v with a TU game v˜ as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let v ∈ Un be an arbitrary (j, k) simple game. The average game, denoted by v˜,
associated to v is defined by
v˜(S) =
1
jn(k − 1)
∑
x∈Jn
[v((j − 1)S , x−S)− v(0S , x−S)] (9)
for all S ⊆ N .
With that notation our above remark reads:
Theorem 4.1. For every (j, k) simple game v the vector Φ(v) equals the Shapley value of v˜.
For the (j, k) simple game v from Example 3.1 the average simple game is given by
v˜(∅) = 0, v˜({1}) =
1
2
, v˜({2}) =
2
3
, and v˜(N) = 1.
Before giving some properties of the average game operator we note that two distinct (j, k) simple
games may have the same average game, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.1. Consider the (j, k) simple games u, v ∈ Un defined by
• u(x) = k − 1 if x = 1 and u(x) = 0 otherwise;
• v(x) = k − 1 if x 6= 0 and v(x) = 0 otherwise
for all x ∈ Jn. Obviously, u 6= v. A simple calculation, using Equation (9), gives u˜(S) = v˜(S) =
1
jn−s
for all S ∈ 2N .
The average game operator has some nice properties among which are the following:
Proposition 4.1. Given a (j, k) simple game v ∈ Un,
(a) v˜ is a TU game on N that is [0, 1]-valued and monotone;
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(b) any null player in v is a null player in v˜;
(c) any two equivalent players in v are equivalent in v˜;
(d) if v =
∑p
t=1 αtvt is a convex combination for some v1, . . . , vp ∈ Un, then v˜ =
∑p
t=1 αtv˜t.
Proof. Let v ∈ Un.All mentioned properties of v˜ are more or less transfered from the corresponding
properties of v via Equation (9). More precisely:
(a) Note that v˜(∅) = 1
jn(k−1)
∑
x∈Jn [v(x) − v(x)] = 0 and v˜(N) =
1
jn(k−1)
∑
x∈Jn [v((j− 1))− v(0)] =
1. Since v is monotone and 0 ≤ x ≤ (j− 1) for all x ∈ Jn, we have v((j − 1)S , x−S) ≤
v((j− 1)S , x−T ) and v(0S , x−S) ≥ v(0S , x−T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Thus, we can conclude
0 ≤ v˜(S) ≤ v˜(T ) ≤ 1 from Equation (9).
(b) Let i ∈ N be a null player in v and S ⊆ N\{i}. Since v((j − 1)S∪{i}, x−(S∪{i})) = v((j− 1)S , x−S)
and v(0S∪{i}, x−(S∪{i})) = v(0S , x−S), we have that v˜(S∪{i}) = v˜(S), i.e., player i is a null player
in v˜.
(c) Let i, h ∈ N be two equivalent players in v, S ⊆ N\{i, h}, and πih ∈ Sn the transposition
that interchanges i and h. Since v((j− 1)S∪{i}, x−(S∪{i})) = v((j − 1)S∪{h} , (πihx)−S∪{h}) and
v(0S∪{i}, x−(S∪{i})) = v(0S∪{h} , (πihx)−S∪{h}), we have v˜(S∪{i}) = v˜(S∪{h}), i.e., players i and
h are equivalent in v˜.
(d) Now suppose that v =
∑p
t=1 αtvt is a convex combination for some v1, v2, · · · , vp ∈ Un. Since
v((j− 1)S , x−S) =
∑p
t=1 αtvt((j− 1)S , x−S) and v(0S , x−S) =
∑p
t=1 αtvt(0S , x−S), Equation (9)
gives v˜(S) =
∑p
t=1 αtv˜t(S) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N .
The operator that associates each (j, k) simple game v with its average game v˜ can be seen as a
coalitional representation of (j, k) simple games. Moreover, Proposition 4.1 suggests that this represen-
tation preserves some properties of the initial game. The average game of a (j, k) simple game with a
point-veto is provided by:
Proposition 4.2. Given a ∈ Jn\{0}, the average game u˜a satisfies for every coalition S 6= N
u˜a (S) =


∏
i∈N\S
(
j − ai
j
)
if S ∩Na 6= ∅
0 if S ∩Na = ∅
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Proof. Let a ∈ Jn\{0} and ∅ ( S ( N .
First suppose that S ∩Na = ∅. Then, for all x ∈ Jn we have a ≤ ((j− 1)S , x−S) iff a ≤ (0S , x−S).
Thus, ua(((j− 1)S , x−S)) = u
a((0S , x−S)). It then follows from (9) that u˜a(S) = 0.
Now suppose that S∩Na 6= ∅. Then, for all x ∈ Jn we have a  (0S , x−S). Thus, ua((0S , x−S)) = 0.
Note that a ≤ ((j− 1)S, x−S) iff a−S ≤ x−S . Hence,
u˜a(S) =
1
jn(k − 1)
∑
x∈Jn
ua((j− 1)S , x−S) =
1
jn−s(k − 1)
∑
x−S∈J−S
ua((j− 1)S , x−S)
=
1
jn−s(k − 1)
∑
x−S∈J−S ∧ a−S≤x−S
ua((j− 1)S , x−S)
=
1
k − 1
· (k − 1)
|{x−S ∈ J
−S , a−S ≤ x−S}|
jn−s
=
∏
i∈N\S
(
j − ai
j
)
.
It may be interesting to check whether each (j, k) simple game may be decomposed as a combination
of (j, k) simple game with a point-veto of the form a ∈ {0, j − 1}n. The response is affirmative when
one considers combinations between average games. Before we prove this, recall that the average game
associated with each (j, k) simple game is a TU game on N . The set of all TU games on N is vector
space and a famous basis consists in all unanimity games (γS)S∈2N , where γS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and
γS(T ) = 0 otherwise.
1
In Definition 2.3 we have introduced the notation wS = ua for a coalition S ∈ 2N , where a ∈ Jn is
specified by ai = j − 1 if i ∈ S and ai = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 4.3. For every coalition C ∈ 2N , there exists a collection of real numbers (yS)S∈2C such
that
w˜C =
∑
S∈2C
ySγS .
Proof. Note that w˜C is a TU game on N . Therefore, for some real numbers (yS)S∈2N we have
w˜C =
∑
S∈2N
ySγS . (10)
This proves the result for C = N . Now, suppose that C 6= N . Consider Ek = {T ∈ 2
N , T\C 6=
∅ and |T | = k} for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We prove by induction on k that yT = 0 for all coalitions T ∈ Ek.
More formally, consider the assertion P(k) : for allT ∈ Ek, we have yT = 0.
1The definition of unanimity games has already been given in the second paragraph of Section 2.
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First assume that, k = 1. Let T ∈ Ek, then there exists i ∈ N\C such that T = {i}. Since player i
is not contained in C, Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 4.1 yield that i is a null player in w˜C , so that
w˜C(T ) = 0. Since Equation (10) gives w˜C(T ) =
∑
S∈2T yS = yT , we have yT = 0. Therefore P(1)
holds. Now consider 2 ≤ k ≤ n suppose and P(l) holds for all 1 ≤ l < k. Let T ∈ Ek, then there exists
i ∈ N\C such that T = K∪{i}, i /∈ K 6= ∅. Since i is a null player in w˜C , we have w˜C(T )− w˜C(K) = 0.
Using Equation (10) we compute:
w˜C(T )− w˜C(T ) =
∑
S∈2T
yS −
∑
S∈2K
yS = yT +
∑
i∈S T
yS = yT
using S\C 6= ∅ and 1 ≤ |S| < |T | = k. Thus, we have yT = 0, which proves our claim.
Proposition 4.4. For every (j, k) simple game u ∈ Un, there exists a collection of real numbers (xS)S∈2N
such that
u˜ =
∑
S∈2N
xSw˜S . (11)
Proof. The result is straightforward when j = 2 since J reduces to J = {0, 1}. In the rest of the
proof, we assume that j ≥ 3. Note that all TU games on N can be written as a linear combination of
unanimity games (γS)S∈2N . It is then sufficient to only prove that each TU game γC for C ∈ 2
N is a
linear combination of the TU games (w˜S)S∈2C . The proof is by induction on 1 ≤ k = |C| ≤ n. More
precisely, we prove the assertion A(k) that for all C ∈ 2N such that |C| ≤ k, there exists a collection
(zS)S∈2C such that
γC =
∑
S∈2C
zSw˜S . (12)
First assume that k = 1. Using Proposition 4.2, it can be easily checked that we have γ{i} = w˜{i}
for all i ∈ N . Therefore A(1) holds. Now, consider a coalition C such that |C| = k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and
assume that A(l) holds for all l such that 1 ≤ l < k. By Proposition 4.3, there exists some real numbers
(αS)S∈2C and (βS)S∈2C\{C} such that
w˜C =
∑
S∈2C
αSγS = αCγC +
∑
S∈2C\{C}
αSγS = αCγC +
∑
S∈2C\{C}
βSw˜S .
where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis. Moreover, αC can be determined using
Proposition 4.2 for c = |C| by:
αC =
∑
S∈2C
(−1)|C\S|w˜C(S) =
c∑
s=1
(−1)c−s
(
c
s
)(
j − 1
j
)c−s
=
1− (1− j)c
jc
6= 0 since j − 1 ≥ 2.
Therefore we get
γC =
∑
S∈2C
zSw˜S
15
where for all S ∈ 2C , zS = −
1
αC
if S = C and zS = −
βS
αC
otherwise. This gives A(k). In summary,
each γS , S ∈ 2
N is a linear combination of w˜C , C ∈ 2N . Thus, the proof is completed since u˜ is a linear
combination of γS , S ∈ 2
N .
Before we continue, note that by Equation (12), for C ∈ 2N each TU game γC is a linear combination
of the TU games
(
w˜S
)
S∈2N
. Since (γS)S∈2N is a basis of the vector space of all TU games on N , it
follows that
(
w˜S
)
S∈2N
is also a basis of the vector space of all TU games on N .
5 A characterization of the Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) simple
games
As shown in Proposition 3.2 the axioms of Definition 3.1 are not sufficient to uniquely characterize the
power index Φ for the class of (j, k) simple games. Therefore we introduce an additional axiom.
Definition 5.1. A power index F for (j, k) simple games is averagely convex (AC) if we always have
p∑
t=1
αtF (ut) =
q∑
t=1
βtF (vt) (13)
whenever
p∑
t=1
αtu˜t =
q∑
t=1
βtv˜t, (14)
where u1, u2, . . . , up, v1, v2, . . . , vq ∈ Un and (αt)1≤t≤p, (βt)1≤t≤q are non-negative numbers that sum to
1 each.
One may motivate the axiom (AC) as follows. In a game, the a priori strength of a coalition, given
the profile of the other individuals, is the difference between the outputs observed when all of her
members respectively give each her maximum support and her minimum support. The average strength
game associates each coalition with her expected strength when the profile of other individuals uniformly
varies. Average convexity for power indices is the requirement that whenever the average game of a game
is a convex combination of the average games of two other games, then the same convex combination
still applies for the power distributions.
We remark that the axiom of Average Convexity is much stronger than the axiom of Convexity. A
minor technical point is that
∑p
t=1 αtut as well as
∑q
t=1 βtvt do not need to be (j, k) simple games.
However, the more important issue is that
p˜∑
t=1
αtut
Proposition 4.1.(d)
=
p∑
t=1
αtu˜t =
q∑
t=1
βtv˜t
Proposition 4.1.(d)
=
q˜∑
t=1
βtvt,
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i.e., Equation (14), is far less restrictive than
p∑
t=1
αtut =
q∑
t=1
βtvt
since two different (j, k) simple games may have the same average game, see Example 4.1. Further
evidence is given by the fact that the parametric power indices Φa, defined in Equation (8), do not all
satisfy (AC).
Proposition 5.1. When j ≥ 3, there exists some a ∈ Jn such that Φa does not satisfy (AC).
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.3, consider the (j, k) simple game with point-veto b = (1, j −
1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Jn and let a = (j−2, j−2, · · · , j−2). It can be easily checked that, for all subsets T ⊆ N
we have
u˜b(T ) =


1 if 1, 2 ∈ T
(j − 1)/j if 2 ∈ T ⊆ N\{1}
1/j if 1 ∈ T ⊆ N\{2}
0 if T ⊆ N\{1, 2}
and that
u˜b =
1
j
· w˜{1} +
j − 1
j
· w˜{2} (15)
holds. Since Φa satisfies (NP), (E), (S) we can easily compute Φa
(
w{1}
)
= (1, 0, · · · , 0) and Φa
(
w{2}
)
=
(0, 1, 0, · · · , 0). Therefore,
1
j
· Φa
(
w{1}
)
+
j − 1
j
· Φa
(
w{2}
)
=
(
1
j
,
j − 1
j
, 0, · · · , 0
)
. (16)
Using (8), one gets Φa(ub) = (0, 1, 0, · · · , 0). It then follows from equations (15) and (16) that Φa does
not satisfy (AC).
As a preliminary step to our characterization result in Theorem 5.1 we state:
Lemma 5.1. If a power index F for the class Un of (j, k) simple games satisfies (E), (S), and (NP),
then we have F (wC ) = Φ(wC) for all C ∈ 2N .
Proof. Let F be a power index on Un that satisfies (E), (S), (NP) and let C ∈ 2
N be arbitrary.
According to Proposition 2.1, all players i, j ∈ C are equivalent in wC and those outside of C are null
players in the game wC . Since both F and Φ satisfy (E), (S), and (NP), we have Fi(w
C) = Φi(w
C) =
1
|C|
if i ∈ C and Fi(w
C) = Φi(w
C) = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 5.1. A power index F for the class Un of (j, k) simple games satisfies (E), (S), (NP), and
(AC) if and only if F = Φ.
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Proof. Necessity : As shown in Proposition 3.1, Φ satisfies (E), (S), and (NP). For (AC) the proof follows
from Theorem 4.1 since the average game operator is linear by Proposition 4.1.
Sufficiency : Consider a power index F for (j, k) simple games that satisfies (E), (S), (NP), and (AC).
Next, consider an arbitrary (j, k) simple game u ∈ Un. By Proposition 4.4, there exists a collection of
real numbers (xS)S∈2N such that
u˜ =
∑
S∈2N
xSw˜S =
∑
S∈E1
xSw˜S +
∑
S∈E2
xSw˜S , (17)
where E1 = {S ∈ 2
N : xS > 0} and E2 = {S ∈ 2
N : xS < 0}. Note that E1 6= ∅ since u˜(N) = 1. As an
abbreviation we set
̟ =
∑
S∈E1
xSw˜S(N) =
∑
S∈E1
xS > 0. (18)
It follows that
1
̟
u˜+
∑
S∈E2
−xS
̟
w˜S =
∑
S∈E1
xS
̟
w˜S . (19)
Since (19) is an equality among two convex combinations, axiom (AC) yields
1
̟
F (u) +
∑
S∈E2
−xS
̟
F (wS) =
∑
S∈E1
xS
̟
F (wS).
Therefore by Lemma 5.1,
1
̟
F (u) +
∑
S∈E2
−xS
̟
Φ(wS) =
∑
S∈E1
xS
̟
Φ(wS). (20)
Since Φ also satisfies (AC), we obtain
1
̟
F (u) +
∑
S∈E2
−xS
̟
Φ(wS) =
1
̟
Φ(u) +
∑
S∈E2
−xS
̟
Φ(wS), (21)
so that F (u) = Φ(u).
Proposition 5.2. For j ≥ 3, the four axioms in Theorem 5.1 are independent.
Proof. For each of the four axioms in Theorem 5.1, we provide a power index on Un that meets the
three other axioms but not the chosen one.
• The power index 2 · Φ satisfies (NP), (S), and (AC) but not (E).
• Denote by ED the equal division power index which assigns 1
n
to each player for every (j, k) simple
game v. Then, the power index 12 · Φ+
1
2 · ED satisfies (E), (S) and (AC), but not (NP).
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• In Proposition 3.2 we have constructed a parametric series of power indices that satisfiy (E), (S),
and (NP). For j ≥ 3, at least one example does not satisfy (AC), see Proposition 5.1.
• Recall that
(
w˜S
)
S∈2N
is a basis of the vector space of all TU games on N . Thus given a (j, k)-
simple game u, there exists a unique collection of real numbers (xuS)S∈2N such that
u˜ =
∑
S∈2N
xuSw˜
S . (22)
Consider some i0 ∈ N and set
F (u) =
∑
S∈2N
xuS · F
(
wS
)
. (23)
For each S ∈ 2N\{N} we set Fi
(
wS
)
= Φ
(
wS
)
. For S = N we set Fi
(
wN
)
=
2
n+ 1
if i = i0 and
Fi
(
wN
)
=
1
n+ 1
otherwise. We can easily check that F satisfies (E), (NP), (AC), but not (S).
This proves that the four axioms in Theorem 5.1 are independent.
6 Axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik index for interval simple games
Similar as for (j, k) simple games a Shapley-Shubik like index for interval simple games can be con-
structed from the idea of the roll-call model.
Definition 6.1. (cf. [12, Definition 6.2])
Let v be an interval simple game with player set N and i ∈ N an arbitrary player. We set
Ψi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
[
v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
]
−
[
v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i)− v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)
]
dx1 . . . dxn. (24)
In this section, we give a similar axiomatization for Ψ (for interval simple games) as we did for (j, k)
simple games and Φ. By a power index for interval simple games we understand a mapping from the
set of interval simple games for n players to Rn. Replacing J by I = [0, 1] in Definition 3.1, allows us
to directly transfer the properties of power indices for (j, k) simple games to the present situation. Also
Proposition 3.1 is valid for interval simple games and Ψ. More precisely, Ψ satisfies (P), (A), (S), (E),
(NP), and (T), see [13, Lemma 6.1]. The proof for (C) and (L) goes along the same lines as the proof
of Proposition 3.1. Also the generalization of the power index to a parametric class can be done just as
the one for (j, k) simple games in Equation (8).
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Proposition 6.1. For every α ∈ [0, 1] the mapping Ψa, where a = (α, . . . , α) ∈ [0, 1]n, defined by
Ψai (v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
( [
v(api<i ,1pi≥i)− v(api<i ,0pi≥i)
]
−
[
v(api≤i ,1pi>i)− v(api≤i ,0pi>i)
] )
for all i ∈ N , satisfies (P), (A), (S), (E), (NP), (T), (C), and (L).
Again, there exist vectors a ∈ [0, 1]n and interval simple games v with Ψa(v) 6= Ψ(v). Also the
simplified formula for Φ for (j, k) simple games in Lemma 3.1 can be mimicked for interval simple games
and Ψ, see [14].
Proposition 6.2. For every interval simple game v with player set N and every player i ∈ N we have
Ψi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
· [C(v, S)− C(v, S\{i})] , (25)
where C(v, T ) =
∫
[0,1]n v(1T , x−T )− v(0T , x−T ) dx for all T ⊆ N .
This triggers:
Definition 6.2. Let v be an interval simple game on N . The average game associated with v and
denoted by v̂ is defined via
∀S ⊆ N, v̂(S) =
∫
In
[v(1S , x−S)− v(0S , x−S)]dx. (26)
Theorem 6.1. For all every interval simple game v on N and for all i ∈ N ,
Ψi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n − s)!
n!
[v̂(S)− v̂(S\{i}] (27)
In other words, for a given interval simple game v the power distribution Ψ(v) is given by the Shapley
value of its average game vˆ.
As with (j, k) simple games, two distinct interval simple games may have the same average game as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 6.1. Consider the interval simple games u and v defined on N respectively for all x ∈ [0, 1]n
by : u(x) = 1 if x = 1, and u(x) = 0 otherwise; v(x) = 1 if x 6= 0, and v(x) = 0 otherwise. It is
clear that, u 6= v. But, Equation (26) and a simple calculation give û(S) = v̂(S) = 1 if S = N and
û(S) = v̂(S) = 0 otherwise.
We can also transfer Proposition 4.1, i.e., the average game operator preserves the following nice
properties of interval simple games.
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Proposition 6.3. For all v ∈ CSGn, v̂ is a [0, 1]-valued TU game on N such that
(a) v̂ is a TU game on N that is [0, 1]-valued and monotone;
(b) any null voter in v is null player in v̂;
(c) any two symmetric voters in v are symmetric players in v̂;
(d) if v =
∑p
t=1 αtvt is a convex combination for some v1, . . . , vp ∈ Un then v̂ =
∑p
t=1 αtv̂t.
Proof. Very similar to the one of Proposition 4.1.
From Theorem 6.1 we can directly conclude that Ψ also satisfies Average Convexity (AC), which is
defined as in Definition 5.1.
For the remaining part of this section we introduce some further notation. For all x ∈ In, let
1x = {i ∈ N, xi = 1}; and given a coalition S, let C
S be the interval simple game defined for all x ∈ In
by CS(x) = 1 if S ⊆ 1x and C
S(x) = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 6.4. For all T ∈ 2N , ĈS = γS .
Proof. Consider S, T ⊆ N . If S ⊆ T then for all x ∈ [0, 1]n, S ⊆ T ⊆ {i ∈ N, (1T , x−T )i = 1} and
S ∩ {i ∈ N, (0T , x−T )i = 1} = ∅. Then by definition of C
S, CS(1T , x−T ) = 1 and C
S(0T , x−T ) = 0.
Therefore,
ĈS(T ) =
∫
[0,1[n
[CS(1T , , x−T )− C
S(0T , x−T )]dx = 1 = γS(T ).
Now assume that S * T . Let x ∈ [0 1)n. Note that {i ∈ N, (1T , x−T )i = 1} = T and {i ∈
N, (0T , x−T )i = 1} = ∅. Therefore, S * {i ∈ N, (1T , x−T )i = 1} and S * {i ∈ N, (0T , x−T )i = 1}. By
the definition of CS, it follows that CS(1T , x−T ) = C
S(0T , x−T ) = 0. Hence
ĈS(T ) =
∫
[0,1[n
[CS(1T , x−T )− C
S(0T , x−T )]dx = 0 = γS(T ).
In both cases ĈS(T ) = γS(T ) for all T ∈ 2
N ; that is ĈS = γS .
Theorem 6.2. A power index Ψ′ for interval simple games satisfies (E), (S), (NP) and (AC) if and
only if Ψ′ = Ψ.
Proof.
Necessity : We have already remarked that Ψ satisfies (E), (S), (AC), and (NP).
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Sufficiency : Let Ψ′ be a power index for interval simple games on N that simultaneously satisfies (E),
(S), (AC), and (NP). Consider an interval simple game u. Note that û is a TU game by Proposition 6.3.
Thus by Proposition 6.4, there exists a collection of real numbers (αS)S∈2N such that
û =
∑
S∈2N
αS · ĈS =
∑
S∈E1
αS · ĈS +
∑
S∈E2
αS · ĈS (28)
where E1 = {S ∈ 2
N : αS > 0} and E2 = {S ∈ 2
N : αS < 0}. Moreover, E1 6= ∅ since v̂(N) = 1. We set
̟ =
∑
S∈E1
αS · ĈS(N) =
∑
S∈E1
αS > 0. (29)
It follows that
1
̟
û+
∑
S∈E2
−αS
̟
ĈS =
∑
S∈E1
αS
̟
ĈS. (30)
Since (30) is an equality among two convex combinations, then by (AC), we deduce that
1
̟
Ψ′(u) +
∑
S∈E2
−αS
̟
Ψ′(CS) =
∑
S∈E1
αS
̟
Ψ′(CS). (31)
Note that given S ∈ 2N , all voters in S are equivalent in CS while all voters outside S are null
players in CS. Since Ψ′ and Ψ satisfy (E), (S), and (NP), it follows that Ψ′(CS) = Ψ(CS). Thus,
1
̟
Ψ′(u) +
∑
S∈E2
−αS
̟
Ψ(CS) =
∑
S∈E1
αS
̟
Ψ(CS). (32)
Since Ψ also satisfies (AC), we get
1
̟
Ψ′(u) +
∑
S∈E2
−αS
̟
Ψ(CS) =
1
̟
Ψ(u) +
∑
S∈E2
−αS
̟
Ψ(CS). (33)
Hence Ψ′(u) = Ψ(u), which proves that Ψ′ = Ψ.
Proposition 6.5. The four axioms in Theorem 6.2 are independent.
Proof.
• The power index 2 ·Ψ satisfies (NP), (S), (AC), but not (E).
• Denote by ED the equal division power index which assigns 1
n
to each player for every interval
simple game. Then the power index 12 ·Ψ+
1
2 · ED satisfies (E), (S) and (AC), but not (NP).
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• In Proposition 6.1 (c.f. [14, Proposition 4]) we have stated a parametric classes of power indices
for interval simple games that satisfy (E), (S), and (NP). In [14] it was also proved that there is
at least one parameter a for which the parameterized index Ψa 6= Ψ. Thus, by Theorem 6.2 we
can conclude that Ψa does not satisfies (AC). (Also Proposition 5.1 for (j, k) simple games can be
adjusted easily.)
• Note that by Proposition 6.4 the set
(
ĈS
)
S∈2N
is a basis of the vector space of all TU games
on N . Thus, given an interval simple game u, there exists a unique collection of real numbers
(yuS)S∈2N such that
û =
∑
S∈2N
yuSĈ
S . (34)
Consider some i0 ∈ N and set
F (u) =
∑
S∈2N
yuS · F
(
CS
)
. (35)
For each S ∈ 2N\{N} we set Fi
(
CS
)
= Φ
(
CS
)
. For S = N we set Fi
(
CN
)
=
2
n+ 1
if i = i0 and
Fi
(
CN
)
=
1
n+ 1
otherwise. We can easily check that F satisfies (E), (NP), (AC), but not (S).
This proves that the four axioms in Theorem 6.2 are independent.
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